Bạn,
Tiếp theo bài viết ngắn gồm thật nhiều câu hỏi không lời giải đáp về nhạc thuật của nhạc sĩ Lê Uyên Phương ( http://hoctroviet.blogspot.com/2011/05/vai-cam-nghi-ve-nhac-thuat-cua-nhac-si.html ), tôi lựa ra bài nhạc đầu tay "Buồn Đến Bao Giờ" rồi tìm tòi, mổ xẻ các kỹ thuật viết nhạc trong đó. Tôi muốn biết "cái sự buồn" đã được tác giả trình bày về phần nhạc thuật ra sao. Các kỹ thuật viết lời đành để sang một bài viết khác.
Thang âm trưởng mà không trưởng
Trước tiên, mời bạn tải về bản nhạc trên ở địa chỉ này, http://www.leuyenphuong.com/tapnhac/Yeu%20nhau%20khi%20con%20tho/BuonDenBaoGio.pdf rồi in ra và để song song khi đọc bài viết này, vì tôi sẽ dành nhiều thời gian bàn đến các nốt nhạc, đoạn nhạc trong đó.
(Cám ơn Dạ Lai Hương đã cho thêm lời minh họa vào video.)
Nghe nhạc ở đây: http://giaocam.saigonline.com/HTML-T/CSThienPhuong/Nhac/DaXanhNSLeUyenPhuong&TrinhCongSonCSThienPhuong/10BuonDenBaoGioNSLeUyenPhuongCSThienPhuong.php
(Xin nói thêm, tôi nghe và cảm được nhạc LUP rất, rất nhiều nhờ tài năng diễn giải bài nhạc và cách thêm thắt các nhạc khí, câu hooks hay intro của nhạc sĩ Duy Cường, cũng như cách diễn đạt bài hát của chị Thiên Phượng. Xin cám ơn hai anh chị thật nhiều. Đĩa CD Đá Xanh xuất bản đã 20 năm nhưng vẫn còn rất mới, tôi khám phá nhiều các chi tiết lạ mỗi lần nghe lại, cứ như là mình lớn lên theo nhạc, chứng tỏ độ già dặn trong cách hòa âm phối khí của anh Cường vượt trước tuổi của anh khi viết hòa âm cho các bài nhạc LUP này.)
Bạn cũng có thể tải về bản PDF do tôi nghe chords lại từ bài anh Cường rồi viết xuống để dễ đàn theo: http://sites.google.com/site/hoctroarticles/home/BuonDenBaoGio.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1
Như bạn biết, thang âm Do trưởng gồm có bảy nốt nhạc: Do Re Mi Fa Sol La Si. Nếu bạn bỏ thì giờ ra đếm từng nốt nhạc trong bài này coi số lần các nốt hiện ra, bạn sẽ thấy hai nốt Mi và Si rất ít khi xảy ra. Nốt Mi là quãng ba trưởng của nốt Do, do vậy nó góp phần làm nên cái "air" (không khí) của bài nhạc. Do vậy, nếu ta đang ở trong Do trưởng mà ta không dùng nhiều nốt Mi, có nghĩa là bài nhạc không hoàn toàn thuần trưởng, với hệ quả là ta tha hồ sử dụng các hợp âm thứ như IIm, IIIm, và VIm (tức Dm, Em, và Am trong thang âm Do trưởng), làm bài nhạc có sắc thái "thứ", tức là "buồn" nhiều hơn vui. Không có nhiều nốt Mi cũng có nghĩa là ra có thể sử dụng nhiều các hợp âm như Dm7, Em7, Am7 hay Am6 cho nhạc có vẻ loãng ra như khi nghe nhạc Blues hay Jazz. Với diễn giải tương tự, bài nhạc có rất ít nốt Si, thường là dùng làm nốt tạm, nhanh để trở về chủ âm Do, chứ không được dùng nhiều để làm tăng kịch tính của bài nhạc.
Thêm vào đó, ở đoạn giữa bài tác giả thêm vào nốt IIIm (Mi b), đây là một nốt trong thang âm G Aeolian (Sol La Si b Do Re Mi b Fa - biến thể của thang âm bậc V - G trưởng- và do đó có nhiều nốt chung với thang âm Do trưởng), thành ra ta có thể dùng các hợp âm buồn bã, bluesy khác như Ab7 hay Fm7.
Tóm lại, ta có thể nói là bài này nhạc sĩ đã dùng thang âm Do Re Fa Sol La, tuy thuộc về trưởng nhưng rất "hà tiện" dùng nốt Mi là quãng 3 trưởng.
Bố cục bài hát
Bài nhạc này được viết dưới dạng ABA'CA, với các phân loại thêm như sau:
A (16 trường canh): Trời mưa mãi ... đêm hè. Gồm có: A1: Trời mưa mãi ... si mê, và A2: Buồn ơi ... đêm hè.
B (16 trường canh): Vòng tay đã ... đến thơ ngây. Gồm có: B1: Vòng tay đã ... đem vào nhau, và B2: Dung nhan ... thơ ngây.
A' (8 trường canh): Vành môi khép ... ân tình.
C (16 trường canh): Em ơi ... đến ngỡ ngàng. Gồm có C1: Em ơi ... tay trơn, và C2: Em ơi Em Ơi ... ngỡ ngàng.
Sau cùng là nhắc lại đoạn A với lời ca khác.
Cân bằng giữa các đoạn nhạc
Bạn thấy, tuy là bản nhạc đầu tay, nhưng sự xắp xếp bố cục cũng là một tính toán già dặn, khi nhạc sĩ để đoạn A' chỉ bằng một nửa độ dài của A, làm bài nhạc rút ngắn một cách bất thường, tuy các nốt nhạc không có gì khác hơn là đoạn A2. Nhạc sĩ Lê Uyên Phương đã nắm bắt được cách xếp số lượng câu nhạc để tạo nên kịch tích của bài nhạc. Tuy đoạn A' kết bằng sự trở về chủ âm Do, do sự thiếu trường canh (8 thay vì 16) ta cảm thấy hụt hẫng - một sự buồn vì không hoàn toàn chăng?
Cũng cần phải bàn thêm một chút về sự cân bằng của các đoạn nhạc với nhau, cũng như cân bằng giữa các câu nhạc nhỏ với nhau, để làm sáng tỏ thêm nghệ thuật viết nhạc nói chung, và của tác giả Lê Uyên Phương nói riêng. Đoạn A1 được coi là không cân bằng, vì nó gồm 2+2+4 trường canh (2: trời mưa mãi mưa hoài + 2: thần tiên giấc mơ dài + 4: vào cuộc đời sỏi đá biết mình si mê). Biết nó cân bằng hay không rất dễ. Bạn hát thử câu đó lên, nếu thấy nhịp điệu và giai điệu còn chưa "đã", thì nó chưa cân bằng. Muốn nó cân bằng, thì thường người nhạc sĩ phải thêm vào một đoạn nữa giống vậy, thì nó sẽ cân bằng vì vế trái đã bằng với vế phải 2+2+4 = 2+2+4.
Thành ra ở đoạn trên, khi tôi nói về cân bằng của A', thì bạn thấy A' = 2+2+4, chỉ có 8 trường canh trong một khối ABA'CA gồm toàn những 16 trường canh, mất cân bằng ở chỗ đó.
Điểm chú ý khác của đoạn A là câu nhạc gồm có 2 motives "trời mưa mãi mưa hoài" và "vào cuộc đời sỏi đá biết mình si mê". Motif 1 được nhắc lại hai lần, lần sau đổi các nốt cùng trong thang âm Do Re Fa Sol La để xuống thấp hơn. Sau đó A2 cũng nhắc lại cấu trúc hệt như đoạn nhạc A1, nhưngvới trường canh cuối trở về chủ âm.
Trong đoạn B, bắt đầu với B1 ta thấy nhạc sĩ dùng y hệt nhịp điệu đoạn A, nhưng câu nhạc đã biến đổi thành một sắc thái khác, đó là vì tác giả đã giới thiệu nốt Fa (chữ rời) như là kết của motif (Vòng tay đã buông rời). Để thấy được tác dụng của sự giới thiệu của nốt Fa này, có lẽ ta cần phải xem lại các nốt cuối các motives của đoạn A:
A1: (...hoài) 5 (...dài) 1 (...mê) 5
A2: (...giờ) 5 (...giờ) 1 (...hè) 1
Không phải chỉ trong đoạn A1 này thôi, mà tôi còn để ý đến các nốt cuối của bất cứ một câu nhạc nhỏ nào trong bài nhạc. Thường thì chúng hay kết thúc ở chủ âm Do (1) hay ở quãng 5 Sol. Đôi khi nó cũng nằm ở quãng 3 (Mi nữa). Nhận xét này đáng kể vì ba lý do.
Thứ nhất, nếu ta dùng nhiều nốt như vậy làm bài sẽ có cảm giác an bình, thường thường, buồn buồn, không lăng xăng, vì không cần phải hóa giải để trở về chủ âm.
(thí dụ về các nốt từ rất ổn định đến rất không ổn định của thang âm Sol trưởng - Trong Do trưởng thì 1, 5, 3 là Do Sol và Mi là các nốt ổn dịnh)
Thứ hai là khả năng dùng nhiều hợp âm jazzy như 6, 7 hoặc 9 cho các chỗ đó, để tạo nên các sắc thái khác nhau, thay vì phải lệ thuộc vào nốt "kịch tính" cùa giai điệu.
Lý do thứ ba là cái nốt Fa vừa nói tới ở trên, vì ít dùng nên khi dùng thì thấy nó mới mẻ, tạo sắc thái riêng cho đoạn B ngay lập tức.
Đoạn B2 còn ly kỳ hơn, khi nốt Mi b (quãng 3 thứ) được giới thiệu lần đầu và rồi lặp lại 4 lần để xác minh sự quan trọng của nó, sau khi đi từ cao trào Mi (còn ánh sáng) -> Mi b (ánh mắt, suối tóc) -> Re (thơ ngây) Có một sự liên hệ mật thiết giữa lời nhạc và nốt nhạc (prosody) trong câu nhạc này, nó làm ánh sáng, rồi ánh mắt sáng hơn phải không bạn?
Các chi tiết nho nhỏ khác làm đoạn B hay lên gồm có: sự thêm vào 4 chữ " chán chường in trên nét môi" (bạn thử hát thiếu chữ in xem có khác không?) làm trường canh trở thành 4 móc đơn - phá nhịp thường gặp trong bài. Thứ hai là cách chặt câu nhỏ ra của B2 khác với đoạn A2: Tìm ánh mắt / tìm suối tóc / khi còn / thơ ngây, làm bài nhạc biến đổi khác đi.
Đoạn C
Nếu như đoạn B giống như đoạn A, rồi đoạn A' chẳng khác gì hơn là A2, nhưng có tác dụng như một cầu nối cho bài, thì trong đoạn C, nhạc sĩ đã làm câu nhạc khác đí bằng cách ... bớt 5 chữ thành hai chữ tán thán "Em ơi", tiếp sau là một câu 4 chữ, cũng khác với cách đặt câu năm chữ như trước. Cấu trúc thì vẫn như vậy 2+2+4, nhưng trong nội tại, căng thẳng, kịch tính đã diễn ra, với đỉnh điểm là bốn chữ tán thán lặp lại trong 4 trường canh "Em ơi Em ơi", đòi hỏi một giải quyết rốt ráo nhưng không hoàn toàn là mười chữ "Xuân nào tàn, Thu nào vàng, môi nào ngỡ ngàng". Ở đây, ta lại thấy một sự kết hợp giữa nhạc và lời thật tuyệt diệu vì chữ "ngỡ ngàng" được cho vào phách yếu (nhịp 2) của trường canh, tạo nên một sự hụt hẫng trong người nghe. Thật là ngỡ ngàng! Ngỡ ngàng đó, nhưng không xa lạ, vì cái sự "buồn len lén tâm tư" đã được giới thiệu sơ sơ bằng cách chẻ câu thành 3/3/2/2 như ở B2 rồi!
Sau khi thêm vào đoạn A với lời nhạc khác để kết thúc bài, nhạc sĩ cho chúng ta thấy một sự chia ly thể hiện trong cách viết nhạc bằng cách nhắc đi nhắc lại các chữ chính buồn ơi và bao giờ ở các nhịp mạnh, để rồi sau cùng chặt hai chữ tháng năm và đợi chờ ra thành tháng đợi năm chờ, nghe nó dài lê thê làm sao.
Càm giác của tôi sau khi nghe bài này, cũng hệt như khi được xem các tranh vẽ của danh họa Salvador Dalí, trong đó tác giả vẽ những hình ảnh như cái đồng hồ trôi tuột theo thời gian, đàn kiến đỏ bò chậm rãi, vách đá không người, v.v. trên một sắc màu cam u buồn, ảm đạm.
Trong nhạc Lê Uyên Phương cũng vậy, cũng những hình ảnh như nằm nghe tiếng mưa nguồn, tưởng em bước chân buồn, rồi trời mưa mãi mưa hoài, vào cuộc đời sỏi đá, vòng tay đã buông rời, ánh sáng huy hoàng, vành môi khép mong chờ, người đi dáng bơ phờ, lá đổ hoa tàn, hai bàn tay trơn, v.v. và v.v. Chỉ toàn là những hình ảnh, xen lẫn với các thái độ như biết mình si mê, còn thương đến bao giờ, đã buông rời, chán chường, thơ ngây, v.v. đan quyện vào nhau, mục đích mô tả một tâm trạng buồn.
Có lẽ vì nhạc của ông mang nhiều tính hội họa, nên các tranh vẽ của ông tuy không được biết đến nhiều như dòng nhạc, nhưng cũng đầy ắp những hình ảnh trừu tượng như nhạc của ông? Mời bạn thưởng thức một số tranh vẽ cũa ông trong trang này: http://www.leuyenphuong.com/Hoihoa/Hoihoa/art.html
Bạn thấy đó, tuy là bài viết đầu tay (1960 tại Pleiku) nhưng nhạc sĩ Lê Uyên Phương đã cho thấy một sự già dặn trong cách bố cục bài nhạc, cách khai triển motives và cách chúng tương tác với nhau, cách đặt lời phù hơp với nét nhạc, cách "hà tiện" nốt nhạc và "bung" ra khi cần, v.v. và v.v. Bài nhạc ẩn tàng một sức sáng tạo với ít nhất ba khúc nhạc A B C khác nhau nhưng hòa trộn với nhau thật gọn ghẽ, "cứ như là cậu với mợ", như thể chúng không thể nào tách rời nhau. Các motives nhạc trong bài nhạc này cũng không hề được vay mượn và sử dụng lại trong các bài nhạc kế, như thể là nhạc sĩ cứ luôn tiến về phía trước. Thật vậy, chúng ta biết nhiều về nhạc sĩ chỉ qua hai tập nhạc Yêu Nhau Khi Còn Thơ và Khi Loài Thú Xa Nhau, chỉ với 21 bài thôi nhưng cũng quá đủ để có một chỗ đứng riêng trong Âm Nhạc Việt Nam, để khi nghe thì không thể nào lầm được nhạc của ông với nhạc người khác.
Bài viết đã dài, xin hẹn bạn trong lần tìm hiểu dòng nhạc Lê Uyên Phương tới.
Hoctro
Tiểu Saigon
5/26/2011
Tài liệu tham khảo:
1. Jack Perricone: Melody in Songwriting - Berklee Press ( http://www.amazon.com/Melody-Songwriting-Techniques-Writing-Berklee/dp/063400638X )
2. Jai Josefs: Writing Music for Hit Songs - Omnibus Press ( http://www.amazon.com/Writing-Music-Songs-Omnibus-Press/dp/0825672457 )
Long believed to be hiding in caves, bin Laden was tracked down in a costly, custom-built hideout not far from a Pakistani military academy. The stunning news of his death prompted relief and euphoria outside the White House and around the globe, yet also fears of terrorist reprisals against the United States and its allies.
"Justice has been done," President Barack Obama said in a dramatic announcement at the White House.
The military operation took mere minutes, and there were no U.S. casualties.
U.S. helicopters ferried troops from Navy SEAL Team Six, a top military counter-terrorism unit, into the compound identified by the CIA as bin Laden's hideout — and back out again in less than 40 minutes. Bin Laden was shot in the head, officials said, after he and his bodyguards resisted the assault.
Three adult males were also killed in the raid, including one of bin Laden's sons, whom officials did not name. One of bin Laden's sons, Hamza, is a senior member of al-Qaida. U.S. officials also said one woman was killed when she was used as a shield by a male combatant, and two other women were injured.
The U.S. official who disclosed the burial at sea said it would have been difficult to find a country willing to accept the remains. Obama said the remains had been handled in accordance with Islamic custom, which requires speedy burial.
"I heard a thundering sound, followed by heavy firing. Then firing suddenly stopped. Then more thundering, then a big blast," said Mohammad Haroon Rasheed, a resident of Abbottabad, Pakistan, after the choppers had swooped in and then out again.
Bin Laden's death marks a psychological triumph in a long struggle that began well before the Sept. 11 attacks. Al-Qaida was also blamed for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa that killed 231 people and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 American sailors in Yemen, as well as countless other plots, some successful and some foiled.
In all, nearly 3,000 were killed in the Sept. 11 attacks nearly 10 years ago, the worst terror assault on American soil.
Moments after Obama's dramatic late-night announcement on Sunday, the State Department warned of the heightened possibility for anti-American violence. In a worldwide travel alert, the department said there was an "enhanced potential for anti-American violence given recent counterterrorism activity in Pakistan."
As news of bin Laden's death spread, hundreds of people cheered and waved American flags at ground zero in New York, the site where al-Qaida hijacked jets toppled the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Thousands celebrated all night outside the White House gates.
As dawn came the crowd had thinned yet some still flowed in to be a part of it. A couple people posed for photographs in front of the White House while holding up front pages of Monday's newspapers announcing bin Laden's death.
"It's a moment people have been waiting for," said, Eric Sauter, 22, a University of Delaware student who drove to Washington after seeing TV coverage of the celebrations.
The development seems certain to give Obama a political lift as the nation swelled in pride. Even Republican critics lauded him.
But its ultimate impact on al-Qaida is less clear.
The greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. is now considered to be the al-Qaida franchise in Yemen, far from al-Qaida's core in Pakistan. The Yemen branch almost took down a U.S.-bound airliner on Christmas 2009 and nearly detonated explosives aboard two U.S. cargo planes last fall. Those operations were carried out without any direct involvement from bin Laden.
The few fiery minutes in Abbottabad followed years in which U.S. officials struggled to piece together clues that ultimately led to bin Laden, according to an account provided by senior administration officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the operation.
Based on statements given by U.S. detainees since the 9/11 attacks, they said, intelligence officials have long known that bin Laden trusted one al-Qaida courier in particular, and they believed he might be living with him in hiding.
Four years ago, the United States learned the man's identity, which officials did not disclose, and then about two years later, they identified areas of Pakistan where he operated. Last August, the man's residence was found, officials said.
For more visit ABC News.com
"Intelligence analysis concluded that this compound was custom built in 2005 to hide someone of significance," with walls as high as 18 feet and topped by barbed wire, according to one official. Despite the compound's estimated $1 million cost and two security gates, it had no phone or Internet running into the house.
By mid-February, intelligence from multiple sources was clear enough that Obama wanted to "pursue an aggressive course of action," a senior administration official said. Over the next two and a half months, the president led five meetings of the National Security Council focused solely on whether bin Laden was in that compound and, if so, how to get him, the official said.
Obama made a decision to launch the operation on Friday, shortly before flying to Alabama to inspect tornado damage, and aides set to work on the details.
The president spent part of his Sunday on the golf course, but cut his round short to return to the White House for a meeting where he and top national security aides reviewed final preparations for the raid.
Two hours later, Obama was told that bin Laden had been tentatively identified.
CIA director Leon Panetta was directly in charge of the military team during the operation, according to one official, and when he and his aides received word at agency headquarters that bin Laden had been killed, cheers broke out around the conference room table.
Administration aides said the operation was so secretive that no foreign officials were informed in advance, and only a small circle inside the U.S. government was aware of what was unfolding half a world away.
In his announcement, Obama said he had called Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari after the raid, and said it was "important to note that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding."
One senior administration told reporters, though, "we were very concerned ... that he was inside Pakistan, but this is something we're going to continue to work with the Pakistani government on."
The compound is about a half-mile from a Pakistani military academy, in a city that is home to three army regiments and thousands of military personnel. Abbottabad is surrounded by hills and with mountains in the distance.
Critics have long accused elements of Pakistan's security establishment of protecting bin Laden, though Islamabad has always denied it, and in a statement the foreign ministry said his death showed the country's resolve in the battle against terrorism.
Still, bin Laden's location raised pointed questions of whether Pakistani authorities knew the whereabouts of the world's most wanted man.
Whatever the global repercussions, bin Laden's death marked the end to a manhunt that consumed most of a decade that began in the grim hours after bin Laden's hijackers flew planes into the World Trade Center twin towers in Manhattan and the Pentagon across the Potomac River from Washington. A fourth plane was commandeered by passengers who overcame the hijackers and forced the plane to crash in the Pennsylvania countryside.
Former President George W. Bush, who was in office on the day of the attacks, issued a written statement hailing bin Laden's death as a momentous achievement. "The fight against terror goes on, but tonight America has sent an unmistakable message: No matter how long it takes, justice will be done," he said.
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Associated Press writers Erica Werner and Ben Feller contributed to this story.
****
Phone call by Kuwaiti courier led to bin Laden
WASHINGTON – When one of Osama bin Laden's most trusted aides picked up the phone last year, he unknowingly led U.S. pursuers to the doorstep of his boss, the world's most wanted terrorist.
That monitored phone call, recounted Monday by a U.S. official, ended a years-long search for bin Laden's personal courier, the key break in a worldwide manhunt. The courier, in turn, led U.S. intelligence to a walled compound in northeast Pakistan, where a team of Navy SEALs shot bin Laden to death.
The violent final minutes were the culmination of years of intelligence work. Inside the CIA team hunting bin Laden, it always was clear that bin Laden's vulnerability was his couriers. He was too smart to let al-Qaida foot soldiers, or even his senior commanders, know his hideout. But if he wanted to get his messages out, somebody had to carry them, someone bin Laden trusted with his life.
Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, detainees in the CIA's secret prison network told interrogators about an important courier with the nom de guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti who was close to bin Laden. After the CIA captured al-Qaida's No. 3 leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he confirmed knowing al-Kuwaiti but denied he had anything to do with al-Qaida.
Then in 2004, top al-Qaida operative Hassan Ghul was captured in Iraq. Ghul told the CIA that al-Kuwaiti was a courier, someone crucial to the terrorist organization. In particular, Ghul said, the courier was close to Faraj al-Libi, who replaced Mohammed as al-Qaida's operational commander. It was a key break in the hunt for in bin Laden's personal courier.
"Hassan Ghul was the linchpin," a U.S. official said.
Finally, in May 2005, al-Libi was captured. Under CIA interrogation, al-Libi admitted that when he was promoted to succeed Mohammed, he received the word through a courier. But he made up a name for the courier and denied knowing al-Kuwaiti, a denial that was so adamant and unbelievable that the CIA took it as confirmation that he and Mohammed were protecting the courier. It only reinforced the idea that al-Kuwaiti was very important to al-Qaida.
If they could find the man known as al-Kuwaiti, they'd find bin Laden.
The revelation that intelligence gleaned from the CIA's so-called black sites helped kill bin Laden was seen as vindication for many intelligence officials who have been repeatedly investigated and criticized for their involvement in a program that involved the harshest interrogation methods in U.S. history.
"We got beat up for it, but those efforts led to this great day," said Marty Martin, a retired CIA officer who for years led the hunt for bin Laden.
Mohammed did not discuss al-Kuwaiti while being subjected to the simulated drowning technique known as waterboarding, former officials said. He acknowledged knowing him many months later under standard interrogation, they said, leaving it once again up for debate as to whether the harsh technique was a valuable tool or an unnecessarily violent tactic.
It took years of work before the CIA identified the courier's real name: Sheikh Abu Ahmed, a Pakistani man born in Kuwait. When they did identify him, he was nowhere to be found. The CIA's sources didn't know where he was hiding. Bin Laden was famously insistent that no phones or computers be used near him, so the eavesdroppers at the National Security Agency kept coming up cold.
Ahmed was identified by detainees as a mid-level operative who helped al-Qaida members and their families find safe havens. But his whereabouts were such a mystery to U.S. intelligence that, according to Guantanamo Bay documents, one detainee said Ahmed was wounded while fleeing U.S. forces during the invasion of Afghanistan and later died in the arms of the detainee.
But in the middle of last year, Ahmed had a telephone conversation with someone being monitored by U.S. intelligence, according to an American official, who like others interviewed for this story spoke only on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive operation. Ahmed was located somewhere away from bin Laden's hideout when he had the discussion, but it was enough to help intelligence officials locate and watch Ahmed.
In August 2010, Ahmed unknowingly led authorities to a compound in the northeast Pakistani town of Abbottabad, where al-Libi had once lived. The walls surrounding the property were as high as 18 feet and topped with barbed wire. Intelligence officials had known about the house for years, but they always suspected that bin Laden would be surrounded by heavily armed security guards. Nobody patrolled the compound in Abbottabad.
In fact, nobody came or went. And no telephone or Internet lines ran from the compound. The CIA soon believed that bin Laden was hiding in plain sight, in a hideout especially built to go unnoticed. But since bin Laden never traveled and nobody could get onto the compound without passing through two security gates, there was no way to be sure.
Despite that uncertainty, intelligence officials realized this could represent the best chance ever to get to bin Laden. They decided not to share the information with anyone, including staunch counterterrorism allies such as Britain, Canada and Australia.
By mid-February, the officials were convinced a "high-value target" was hiding in the compound. President Barack Obama wanted to take action.
"They were confident and their confidence was growing: 'This is different. This intelligence case is different. What we see in this compound is different than anything we've ever seen before,'" John Brennan, the president's top counterterrorism adviser, said Monday. "I was confident that we had the basis to take action."
Options were limited. The compound was in a residential neighborhood in a sovereign country. If Obama ordered an airstrike and bin Laden was not in the compound, it would be a huge diplomatic problem. Even if Obama was right, obliterating the compound might make it nearly impossible to confirm bin Laden's death.
Said Brennan, "The president had to evaluate the strength of that information, and then made what I believe was one of the most gutsiest calls of any president in recent memory."
Brennan told CNN Tuesday that "there was no single piece of information that was an 'ah-hah' moment." He said officials took "bits and pieces" of intelligence gathered and analyzed over a long period of time to nail down the leads they needed.
Obama tapped two dozen members of the Navy's elite SEAL Team Six to carry out a raid with surgical accuracy.
Before dawn Monday morning, a pair of helicopters left Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. The choppers entered Pakistani airspace using sophisticated technology intended to evade that country's radar systems, a U.S. official said.
Officially, it was a kill-or-capture mission, since the U.S. doesn't kill unarmed people trying to surrender. But it was clear from the beginning that whoever was behind those walls had no intention of surrendering, two U.S. officials said.
The helicopters lowered into the compound, dropping the SEALs behind the walls. No shots were fired, but shortly after the team hit the ground, one of the helicopters came crashing down and rolled onto its side for reasons the government has yet to explain. None of the SEALs was injured, however, and the mission continued uninterrupted.
With the CIA and White House monitoring the situation in real time — presumably by live satellite feed or video carried by the SEALs — the team stormed the compound.
Thanks to sophisticated satellite monitoring, U.S. forces knew they'd likely find bin Laden's family on the second and third floors of one of the buildings on the property, officials said. The SEALs secured the rest of the property first, then proceeded to the room where bin Laden was hiding. A firefight ensued, Brennan said.
Ahmed and his brother were killed, officials said. Then, the SEALs killed bin Laden with a bullet just above his left eye, blowing off part his skull, another official said. Using the call sign for his visual identification, one of the soldiers communicated that "Geronimo" had been killed in action, according to a U.S. official.
Bin Laden's body was immediately identifiable, but the U.S. also conducted DNA testing that identified him with near 100 percent certainty, senior administration officials said. Photo analysis by the CIA, confirmation on site by a woman believed to be bin Laden's wife, who was wounded, and matching physical features such as bin Laden's height all helped confirm the identification. At the White House, there was no doubt.
"I think the accomplishment that very brave personnel from the United States government were able to realize yesterday is a defining moment in the war against al-Qaida, the war on terrorism, by decapitating the head of the snake known as al-Qaida," Brennan said.
U.S. forces searched the compound and flew away with documents, hard drives and DVDs that could provide valuable intelligence about al-Qaida, a U.S. official said. The entire operation took about 40 minutes, officials said.
Bin Laden's body was flown to the USS Carl Vinson in the North Arabian sea, a senior defense official said. There, aboard a U.S. warship, officials conducted a traditional Islamic burial ritual. Bin Laden's body was washed and placed in a white sheet. He was placed in a weighted bag that, after religious remarks by a military officer, was slipped into the sea about 2 a.m. EDT Monday.
Said the president, "I think we can all agree this is a good day for America."
___
Associated Press writers Kimberly Dozier, Eileen Sullivan and Ben Feller in Washington and Kathy Gannon in Islamabad, Pakistan, contributed to this report.
That monitored phone call, recounted Monday by a U.S. official, ended a years-long search for bin Laden's personal courier, the key break in a worldwide manhunt. The courier, in turn, led U.S. intelligence to a walled compound in northeast Pakistan, where a team of Navy SEALs shot bin Laden to death.
The violent final minutes were the culmination of years of intelligence work. Inside the CIA team hunting bin Laden, it always was clear that bin Laden's vulnerability was his couriers. He was too smart to let al-Qaida foot soldiers, or even his senior commanders, know his hideout. But if he wanted to get his messages out, somebody had to carry them, someone bin Laden trusted with his life.
Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, detainees in the CIA's secret prison network told interrogators about an important courier with the nom de guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti who was close to bin Laden. After the CIA captured al-Qaida's No. 3 leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he confirmed knowing al-Kuwaiti but denied he had anything to do with al-Qaida.
Then in 2004, top al-Qaida operative Hassan Ghul was captured in Iraq. Ghul told the CIA that al-Kuwaiti was a courier, someone crucial to the terrorist organization. In particular, Ghul said, the courier was close to Faraj al-Libi, who replaced Mohammed as al-Qaida's operational commander. It was a key break in the hunt for in bin Laden's personal courier.
"Hassan Ghul was the linchpin," a U.S. official said.
Finally, in May 2005, al-Libi was captured. Under CIA interrogation, al-Libi admitted that when he was promoted to succeed Mohammed, he received the word through a courier. But he made up a name for the courier and denied knowing al-Kuwaiti, a denial that was so adamant and unbelievable that the CIA took it as confirmation that he and Mohammed were protecting the courier. It only reinforced the idea that al-Kuwaiti was very important to al-Qaida.
If they could find the man known as al-Kuwaiti, they'd find bin Laden.
The revelation that intelligence gleaned from the CIA's so-called black sites helped kill bin Laden was seen as vindication for many intelligence officials who have been repeatedly investigated and criticized for their involvement in a program that involved the harshest interrogation methods in U.S. history.
"We got beat up for it, but those efforts led to this great day," said Marty Martin, a retired CIA officer who for years led the hunt for bin Laden.
Mohammed did not discuss al-Kuwaiti while being subjected to the simulated drowning technique known as waterboarding, former officials said. He acknowledged knowing him many months later under standard interrogation, they said, leaving it once again up for debate as to whether the harsh technique was a valuable tool or an unnecessarily violent tactic.
It took years of work before the CIA identified the courier's real name: Sheikh Abu Ahmed, a Pakistani man born in Kuwait. When they did identify him, he was nowhere to be found. The CIA's sources didn't know where he was hiding. Bin Laden was famously insistent that no phones or computers be used near him, so the eavesdroppers at the National Security Agency kept coming up cold.
Ahmed was identified by detainees as a mid-level operative who helped al-Qaida members and their families find safe havens. But his whereabouts were such a mystery to U.S. intelligence that, according to Guantanamo Bay documents, one detainee said Ahmed was wounded while fleeing U.S. forces during the invasion of Afghanistan and later died in the arms of the detainee.
But in the middle of last year, Ahmed had a telephone conversation with someone being monitored by U.S. intelligence, according to an American official, who like others interviewed for this story spoke only on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive operation. Ahmed was located somewhere away from bin Laden's hideout when he had the discussion, but it was enough to help intelligence officials locate and watch Ahmed.
In August 2010, Ahmed unknowingly led authorities to a compound in the northeast Pakistani town of Abbottabad, where al-Libi had once lived. The walls surrounding the property were as high as 18 feet and topped with barbed wire. Intelligence officials had known about the house for years, but they always suspected that bin Laden would be surrounded by heavily armed security guards. Nobody patrolled the compound in Abbottabad.
In fact, nobody came or went. And no telephone or Internet lines ran from the compound. The CIA soon believed that bin Laden was hiding in plain sight, in a hideout especially built to go unnoticed. But since bin Laden never traveled and nobody could get onto the compound without passing through two security gates, there was no way to be sure.
Despite that uncertainty, intelligence officials realized this could represent the best chance ever to get to bin Laden. They decided not to share the information with anyone, including staunch counterterrorism allies such as Britain, Canada and Australia.
By mid-February, the officials were convinced a "high-value target" was hiding in the compound. President Barack Obama wanted to take action.
"They were confident and their confidence was growing: 'This is different. This intelligence case is different. What we see in this compound is different than anything we've ever seen before,'" John Brennan, the president's top counterterrorism adviser, said Monday. "I was confident that we had the basis to take action."
Options were limited. The compound was in a residential neighborhood in a sovereign country. If Obama ordered an airstrike and bin Laden was not in the compound, it would be a huge diplomatic problem. Even if Obama was right, obliterating the compound might make it nearly impossible to confirm bin Laden's death.
Said Brennan, "The president had to evaluate the strength of that information, and then made what I believe was one of the most gutsiest calls of any president in recent memory."
Brennan told CNN Tuesday that "there was no single piece of information that was an 'ah-hah' moment." He said officials took "bits and pieces" of intelligence gathered and analyzed over a long period of time to nail down the leads they needed.
Obama tapped two dozen members of the Navy's elite SEAL Team Six to carry out a raid with surgical accuracy.
Before dawn Monday morning, a pair of helicopters left Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. The choppers entered Pakistani airspace using sophisticated technology intended to evade that country's radar systems, a U.S. official said.
Officially, it was a kill-or-capture mission, since the U.S. doesn't kill unarmed people trying to surrender. But it was clear from the beginning that whoever was behind those walls had no intention of surrendering, two U.S. officials said.
The helicopters lowered into the compound, dropping the SEALs behind the walls. No shots were fired, but shortly after the team hit the ground, one of the helicopters came crashing down and rolled onto its side for reasons the government has yet to explain. None of the SEALs was injured, however, and the mission continued uninterrupted.
With the CIA and White House monitoring the situation in real time — presumably by live satellite feed or video carried by the SEALs — the team stormed the compound.
Thanks to sophisticated satellite monitoring, U.S. forces knew they'd likely find bin Laden's family on the second and third floors of one of the buildings on the property, officials said. The SEALs secured the rest of the property first, then proceeded to the room where bin Laden was hiding. A firefight ensued, Brennan said.
Ahmed and his brother were killed, officials said. Then, the SEALs killed bin Laden with a bullet just above his left eye, blowing off part his skull, another official said. Using the call sign for his visual identification, one of the soldiers communicated that "Geronimo" had been killed in action, according to a U.S. official.
Bin Laden's body was immediately identifiable, but the U.S. also conducted DNA testing that identified him with near 100 percent certainty, senior administration officials said. Photo analysis by the CIA, confirmation on site by a woman believed to be bin Laden's wife, who was wounded, and matching physical features such as bin Laden's height all helped confirm the identification. At the White House, there was no doubt.
"I think the accomplishment that very brave personnel from the United States government were able to realize yesterday is a defining moment in the war against al-Qaida, the war on terrorism, by decapitating the head of the snake known as al-Qaida," Brennan said.
U.S. forces searched the compound and flew away with documents, hard drives and DVDs that could provide valuable intelligence about al-Qaida, a U.S. official said. The entire operation took about 40 minutes, officials said.
Bin Laden's body was flown to the USS Carl Vinson in the North Arabian sea, a senior defense official said. There, aboard a U.S. warship, officials conducted a traditional Islamic burial ritual. Bin Laden's body was washed and placed in a white sheet. He was placed in a weighted bag that, after religious remarks by a military officer, was slipped into the sea about 2 a.m. EDT Monday.
Said the president, "I think we can all agree this is a good day for America."
___
Associated Press writers Kimberly Dozier, Eileen Sullivan and Ben Feller in Washington and Kathy Gannon in Islamabad, Pakistan, contributed to this report.